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CIVIL PROCEDURE: CONNECTICUT COURT UPHOLDS
CONSTRUCTIVE SERVICE OF PROCESS ON NON-
RESIDENT DEFENDANT IN ANNULMENT ACTION
ACCORDING to the traditional view, an annulment proceeding is an
in personam action requiring personal service of process' because
of the absence of a res or status upon which a court may act in
rem.2 However, in Perlstein v. Perlstein3 the Connecticut Supreme
Court of Errors discarded the traditional view to allow out-of-state
constructive service on a nonresident defendant in an annulment
action.
In Perlstein the plaintiff husband, domiciled in Connecticut,
sought an annulment, alleging bigamy on the part of the defendant
wife at the time of the marriage celebration in Connecticut. The
defendant was served by registered mail sent to her domiciliary
address in New Jersey. She appeared specially4 to attack the court's
jurisdiction on the ground that personal service was required in
annulment actions. Relying on the traditional rule, the lower court
rendered judgment for the defendant.5 On appeal the Supreme
Court of Errors reversed and remanded in an opinion that rejected
the traditional rule requiring in personam procedures.6
I See, e.g., Owen v. Owen, 127 Colo. 359, 257 P.2d 581 (1953); Gayle v. Gayle, 801 Ky.
613, 192 S.W.2d 821 (1946). See also Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) (personal
service is prerequisite to a valid judgment which will be accorded full faith and credit).
See generally Storke, Annulment in the Conflict of Laws, 43 MNN. L. REv. 849
(1959); Vernon, Labyrinthine Ways: Jurisdiction to Annul, 10 J. PuB. L. 47 (1961).
For articles dealing with annulment jurisdiction and service of process within individual
states, see Anderson, Annulment of Marriages in Missouri, 21 Mo. L. Rxv. 119 (1956);
Clark, A Proposal for Some Modest Changes in Colorado Divorce and Annulment
Laws, 26 RocKy MT. L. REv. 221 (1954); Colson, Twenty Years of West Virginia Mar-
riage and Divorce Laws, 58 W. VA. L. Rlv. 128 (1956); Speca, The Development of
Jurisdiction in Annulment of Marriage Cases, 22 U. KANr. Crry L. REv. 109 (1954);
Strahorn, Fifteen Years of Change in Maryland Marriage and Annulment Law and
Domestic Relations Procedures, 13 MD. L. REv. 128 (1953); Vernon, Annulment of
Marriages in New Mexico, Part I.-Jurisdiction, 1 NATURAL Ras. J. 146 (1961).
See text at notes 8-13 infra.
204 A.2d 909 (Conn. Sup. Ct. Err. 1964).
'On the validity of the device of special appearance to challenge lack of jurisdiction
over the person see Harkness v. Hyde, 98 US. 476 (1878); cf. 2 MOORE, FEDERAL Jus-
DicTON 12.12 at 2263 (1961).
5 204 A.2d at 909.
OId. at 910-12. In an earlier case, the court had stated that constructive service
upon a defendant in an annulment proceeding would be invalid. Mazzei v. Cantales,
142 Conn. 173, 112 A.2d 205 (1955). The court in Perlstein distinguished the Mazzei
decision by stating that there was no jurisdiction of the subject matter in Mazzei be-
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The marital status may be dissolved by either annulment or
divorce, but there are conceptual distinctions between the two reme-
dies.7 Historically, an annulment was granted as a consequence of
a condition existing at the time of the marriage celebration, where-
as a divorce was granted for reasons arising after the existence of
a valid marriage." As a result courts have held that the effect of
a divorce is to terminate a pre-existing marital status,9 while an
annulment declares a marriage to be void ab initio pursuant to the
legal fiction of "relation back."' 0 Since a valid marriage must be
proved in divorce cases," the reification of the marital status
establishes a res for purposes of in rem jurisdiction.12 The
traditional rule, however, notes that the effect of "relation back"
in annulment cases deprives the action of a res or status upon which
in rem methods of service of process can be utilized.13
Despite this relatively clear conceptual distinction, confusion has
been caused by the fact that many of the grounds for annulment,
such as bigamy, are also recognized by statute to be a basis for
cause neither party was domiciled in Connecticut. Hence, the discussion of the validity
of constructive service was mere dictum. 204 A.2d at 913.
7The relief now known as annulment was historically a type of divorce granted
by the ecclesiastical courts, and it is said at times that the term "divorce" includes
annulment actions. See Eisenberg v. Eisenberg, 105 Pa. Super. 30, 160 At. 228 (1932); 3
NELSON, DIvoRcE AND ANNULTUENT § 31.02 (2d ed. 1945) [hereinafter cited as NELSON].
Properly speaking, however, such is not generally true in modem law. See, e.g., Ma-
duro v. Maduro, 62 Cal. App. 2d 776, 145 P-2d 683 (Dist. Ct. App. 1944).
Historically courts have not favored annulment. See, e.g., Keller v. Linsenmyer,
101 N.J. Eq. 664, 674, 139 At. 33, 38 (Ch. 1927). Courts have noted that more serious
consequences, of a social and pecuniary nature, may result from annulment than from
divorce, see Johnson County Nat'1 Bank & Trust v. Bach, 189 Kan. 291, 369 P.2d 231
(1961), and that the vigilence with which the law guards the marital status should be
intensified when an attack is made against the initial validity of the marriage. See
Mace v. Mace, 67 R.I. 301, 304, 23 A.2d 185, 186 (1947).
8See I NELSON § 1.08; 2 ScHouIFR, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND DOMESIC
RELATIONS § 1153 (6th ed. 1921) [hereinafter cited as ScHouoR].
0 See, e.g., Petry v. Petry, 47 Cal. App. 2d 594, 118 P.2d 498 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941);
Smith v. Smith, 350 Mo. App. 104, 164 S.W.2d 921 (1942); D'Auria v. D'Auria, 200
Misc. 939, 103 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
10See, e.g., Steerman v. Snow, 94 N.J. Eq. 9, 118 At. 696 (Ch. 1922); Eisenberg v.
Eisenberg, 105 Pa. Super. 80, 160 Atl. 228 (1932); Lindsay v. Lindsay, 148 Wash. 31,
267 Pac. 777 (1928); 3 NELSON §§ 31.07; 2 SCHOULrR § 1081.
" See, e.g., Sclamberg v. Sclamberg, 220 Ind. 209, 41 N.E.2d 801 (1942); Riehl v.
Richl, 101 NJ. Eq. 15, 137 At. 787 (Ch. 1927); Bannon v. Bannon, 270 N.Y. 484, 1
N.E.2d 975 (1936); Lariviere v. Lariviere, 102 Vt. 278, 147 At. 700 (1929); Kisla v.
Kisla, 124 W. Va. 220, 19 S.E.2d 609 (1942).
1 See Delanoy v. Delanoy, 216 Cal. 27, 32, 13 P.2d 719, 720 (1932); Gayle v. Gayle,
301 Ky. 613, 615, 192 S.W.2d 821, 822 (1946). See generally 2a NELSON §§ 21.01-.11
(2d rev. 1961).
" See, e.g., Owen v. Owen, 127 Colo. 359, 257 P.2d 581 (1953); Gayle v. Gayle, supra
note 12.
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divorce.14 Moreover, some courts appear to have ignored the effect
of "relation back" by distinguishing actions based on voidable
rather than void grounds,15 and holding in the former cases
that the marriage status persists until a decree of annulment is
rendered.'0 And in one case the court without explanation required
personal service only in cases where annulment is based upon in-
sanity. 7
The Connecticut court's decision in Perlstein is representative of
the dissatisfaction with the traditional rule of annulment jurisdic-
tion, as is evidenced by the liberalization of annulment procedures
in other states.' 8 The rule was overcome by finding an intangible
res despite the plaintiff's allegation that the marriage was void from
its inception because of the defendant's bigamous conduct.19 Stem-
ming from what was presumptively a legal marriage ceremony and
2, Ten states by statute allow divorce if the marriage is bigamous. ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 34-1202 (Supp. 1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1522 (2) (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
65.04 (9) (1943); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40i § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1956); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
60-1501 (Supp. 1961); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2753 (1956); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.010 (1949):
OHIo R v. CODE ANN. § 3105.01 (A) (Page 1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10 (b) (1955):
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-801 (2) (1955).
Other grounds historically restricted to annulment have been made applicable to
divorce actions by statute. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-312 (10) (1956) (party
incapable of performing sex act at time of marriage); GA. CODE ANN. § 30-102 (1) (1952)
(incestuous marriage); Ky. REv. STAT. § 403.020(2) (e) (1960) (fraud in obtaining the
marriage); NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-301 (2) (1960) (impotency); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-1 (4)
(1953) (wife pregnant by another at the time of marriage).
Maryland and Rhode Island permit divorce for any reason which renders the mar-
riage null and void ab initio. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 24 (1957); R.I GEN. LAWs ANN.
§ 15-5-1 (1956). In Delaware and Washington divorce is allowed if one of the parties
was incapable of consent to the marriage contract because of age. DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
13, §§ 1522 (7), (8) (1953); WAsH. Rxv. CODE ANN. § 26.08.020 (1) (1963).
Only New York permits annulment for reasons arising after marriage. N.Y. DoM.
RrL. LAws § 7 (5), providing that an annulment may be obtained when one of the
spouses becomes insane and remains in an institution for a designated time. This may,
perhaps, be explained in part as a result of the restrictive nature of New York's
limiting the divorce remedy for all practical purposes to cases involving adultery. See
N.Y. DoM. R.EL. LAws § 8.
11 Owen v. Owen, 127 Colo. 359, 257 P.2d 581 (1953); Gayle v. Gayle, 301 Ky. 613,
192 S.W.2d 821 (1946); see 2 SCHOULER § 1081, discussing the historical differences
between void and voidable marriages.
.' E.g., State v. Yoder, 113 Minn. 503, 130 N.W. 10 (1911); Christensen v. Christen-
sen, 144 Neb. 763, 14 N.W.2d 613 (1944).
27 Shafe v. Shafe, 101 Ind. App. 200, 198 N.E. 826 (1935).
18See Buzzi v. Buzzi, 91 Cal. App. 2d 823, 205 P.2d 1125 (Dist. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 894 (1949); Bing Che v. Chan Lai Yung Gee, 89 Cal. App. 2d 877, 202
P.2d 360 (Dist. Ct. App. 1949). In Owen v. Owen, 127 Colo. 359, 257 P.2d 581 (1953),
the Colorado court held annulment actions to be in personam. The legislature
responded by statute declaring annulment proceedings to be in rem. CoLo. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 46-3-8 (Supp. 1960).
11 204 A.2d at 911-12.
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the domicile of one of the parties in the state, the court held that
this res could not be obviated by a party's mere allegations. 20 This
view appears consistent with the conceptual approach to annulment
because a marriage cannot be said to be "void" or "void ab initio"
in the absence of final adjudication.21
By finding an intangible res, the Perlstein decision may be con-
strued as treating annulment within the usual confines of the in
rem-in personam distinction for purposes of authorizing construc-
tive, out-of-state service of process. However, the Connecticut court
also indicated dissatisfaction with the classification of annulment as
either in ren or in personam, and there is language in the court's
opinion implying that annulment jurisdiction may be sui generis. 22
Such an approach would appear consistent with the United States
Supreme Court's treatment of the distinction in other situations,
where the Court has demonstrated a growing reluctance to deter-
mine the validity of service of process on the basis of the orthodox
in rem-in personam distinction 23 The validity of service of process,
therefore, does not hinge upon a characterization of the legal pro-
ceeding as in rem, in personam, or sui generis, but rather upon
questions of due process.
Due process requires compliance with a state statute authorizing
service of process, 24 and sufficient notice under the circumstances
of the case.as It was clear in Perlstein that the plaintiff had com-
20 Ibid.
21 Some courts have found a basis for jurisdiction to exist in the very need for a
judicial determination to clarify the parties' relationship. See Johnson v. Johnson, 245
Ala. 145, 16 So. 2d 401 (1944); Henderson v. Henderson, 187 Va. 121, 46 S.E.2d 10
(1948); cf. Williams v. Williams, 83 Colo. 180, 263 Pac. 725 (1927).
The Connecticut court also noted that the effect of "relation back" in annulment
cases may be set aside in the interests of justice. 204 A.2d at 912; see Gaines v.
Jacobsen, 308 N.Y. 218, 225, 124 N.E.2d 290, 294 (1954). This attitude is evidenced by
statutes providing that issue of annulled marriages are not bastardized by the rendition
of the decree. E.g., CAL. COv. CoDE § 85.
22 204 A.2d at 911. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 297-302 (1942);
Storke, supra note 1, at 855. Originally annulment suits were sui generis proceedings
in the ecclesiastical courts. See Eisenberg v. Eisenberg, 105 Pa. Super. 30, 160 AtI.
228 (1932); 3 NELSON § 31.02.
S"[T]he requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution
do not depend upon a classification [in rem-in personam] for which the standards are
so elusive and confused generally and which, being primarily for state courts to define,
may and do vary from state to state." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 312 (1950).
24 "Constructive notice" can only exist in cases coming fairly within provisions of
the statutes authorizing courts to use constructive service. Nations v. Johnson, 65 U.S.
(24 How.) 195 (1860).
•The method of notice should be reasonably calculated to appraise the parties of
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plied with a Connecticut statute authorizing service by registered
mail,2 6 and the defendant's special appearance established the fact
actual notice had been received. Although the line between juris-
diction over the person and jurisdiction over the subject matter is
somewhat unclear 27 due process also requires a state interest in
adjudicating the plaintiff's claim.28  Furthermore, in those cases
where a court is not adjudicating rights to tangible property within
the jurisdiction of a state, the Supreme Court now appears to insist
that the defendant have sufficient minimal contacts with the forum
state to empower that state to exercise jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants. 29
the pendency of the action, and afford a reasonable opportunity to be heard. See, e.g.,
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
28 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-68 (1960).
2 7 The right of a court to decide an annulment case-jurisdiction of the subject
matter-has now been set out by statute in most states, but has been the subject of a
mild controversy. Because of the supposed similarity between divorce and annulment
many courts in determining annulment jurisdiction have adhered to the "domicile"
doctrine as defined by the Supreme Court for divorce actions in Williams v. North
Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942). However, the Supreme Court in its only decision on
annulment jurisdiction did not impose the restrictive domicile rule of divorce, but did
recognize it as a sufficient base for jurisdiction of the subject matter in annulment
cases. Sutton v. Lieb, 342 U.S. 402, 406 (1952). As a result jurisdiction has been
upheld in cases where either the plantiff or defendant is domiciled within the forum
state. See Annot., 128 A.L.R. 61, 64 (1940).
The current controversy is between the state of domicile and the state of celebration
-whether the two states should exercise concurrent jurisdiction. Most courts would
accept jurisdiction of the subject matter if the purported marriage took place in
the forum state, irrespective of the parties' domicile or residence at the time of the
suit. See, e.g., Feigenbaum v. Feigenbaum, 210 Ark. 186, 194 S.W.2d 1012 (1946);
Becker v. Becker, 58 App. Div. 374, 69 N.Y. Supp. 75 (1901); Sawyer v. Slack, 196 N.C.
697, 146 S.E. 864 (1929); McDade v. McDade, 16 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
Contra, Antoine v. Antoine, 132 Miss. 442, 96 So. 305 (1923) (only the state of domicile
may have jurisdiction); Turner v. Turner, 85 N.H. 249, 157 Atl. 532 (1931) (must
have at least residence of one of the parties). At one time it was argued that only
the state of celebration should have jurisdiction, based on the now discredited "vested
rights theory" which held that only a state which "creates" a status can dissolve it.
Compare Goodrich, Jurisdiction to Annul A Marriage, 32 HRv. L. Rxv. 806 (1919),
with Goodrich, Conflicts 269 (4th ed. Scoles 1964) and McMurray & Cunningham,
Jurisdiction to Pronounce Null a Marriage Celebrated in Another State or Foreign
Country, 18 CAur. L. REV. 105 (1930).There is a lack of authority as to the sufficiency of residency short of domicile to
allow a court to have jurisdiction of the subject matter in an annulment proceeding.
See Vernon, Labyrinthine Ways: Jurisdiction to Annul, 10 J. Pun. L. 47, 75-77 (1961)
wherein the author argues that annulment should be considered a transitory action,
but requiring personal service if not brought within the state of domicile or celebration
See note 6 supra.28 See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Hess v. Pawloski,
274 U.S. 352 (1927).
29 See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); cf. International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, 326 U.S 310 (1945) Many states, in light of these cases, have promulgated statutes
(Vol. 1965: 616
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Since the Perlstein court required one of the parties to be domi-
ciled within the state, 0 it would appear that the state of Connecti-
cut had a sufficient interest in the marital status of its domiciliary
to entertain an action determining the validity of the status.31 Other-
wise, legal rights of the domiciliary would remain uncertain as, for
example, in applying the state's laws of intestate succession and
freedom to marry.32 The court intimated, however, that if neither
party was a domiciliary, the place of marriage celebration would
afford an insufficient basis for jurisdiction over the subject matter.88
This is seemingly inconsistent with its finding of an intangible res,
unless the court meant to imply that the res accompanies the
parties.3 4 It is arguable that even as a disinterested third state,
Connecticut would still have an interest in adjudicating the validity
of a marriage to which its laws had accorded legal sanction.
On the other hand, the court apparently felt that classification
of the marital status as an "intangible res" precluded the necessity
of evaluating the defendant's contacts with the forum. It is notable,
however, that the Supreme Court's concern with convenience and
fairness,88 combined with the apparent dissatisfaction for evaluating
due process in terms of the in rem-in personam distinction,86 might
dictate another result. When a court is adjudicating the rights of
all parties to a tangible res found within the jurisdiction, it is
reasonable to hold that contacts with the state of those interested
in the property are unnecessary purely for purposes of establishing
ownership of the res. Where an intangible res is created, however,
the location of that res for purposes of ascertaining jurisdiction
thereover is more uncertain.37 Without addressing itself to the ques-
allowing personal service made outside of the state to be effective. See, e.g., ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1956).
31 See 204 A.2d at 913; note 6 supra.
31 In Sutton v. Lieb, 342 U.S. 402, 406 (1952) the Supreme Court implicitly recog-
nized that the domicile of one of the parties would be sufficient for a court to have
subject matter jurisdiction in annulment proceedings.
3" See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CoDE § 61 (no remarriage without previous marriage being
annulled or dissolved); c. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 11 (Smith-Hurd 1961) (rules of
intestate succession assume decedent to have been legally married).
88 See 204 A.2d at 913.
3, This would be in accord with the rule governing jurisdiction in garnishment
cases. See Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
I" McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957); Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank 8, Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15, 319 (1950).
"1 See note 23 supa and accompanying text.
'7 Unlike the tangible res cases in which only one state may have jurisdiction in
rem, the concept of an intangible res may allow jurisdiction to be found in many
states, or at least wherever the parties are domiciled or residents.
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tion, the effect of the Perlstein decision is that celebration of a
marriage within the forum constitutes a sufficient contact to enable
a court to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. 8 Al-
though defensible, this rule might violate fundamental concepts of
fairness and convenience if, for example, the defendant was a minor
rushed in and out of the state to take advantage of a liberal marriage
law. There may be other factors which the court should have
evaluated to ascertain sufficient minimal contacts: these might in-
dude the forum in which the parties had consummated their mar-
riage, the forum in which the parties had spent most of their married
life, or the forum in which the parties resided immediately prior
to separation.
The fact that the court in Perlstein did not clearly articulate
whether its jurisdiction was in rem as opposed to a sui generis form,
moreover, leaves uncertain the ability of the court to render a money
judgment. Although in rem jurisdiction is sufficient to terminate a
marriage, Connecticut classifies a decree for support as a judgment
in personam requiring personal service.39
The Perlstein decision, therefore, appears satisfactory, but leaves
several questions unanswered. In light of the general confusion
surrounding an action to annul a marriage, the best solution would
be enlightened legislative action 40 declaring the requirements to be
met for jurisdiction over both the person and the subject matter,
as well as the appropriate method of service.41
38 Cf. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1956).
'9 Carter v. Carter, 147 Conn. 238, 159 A.2d 173 (1960). The same rule applies to
divorce actions, where the marriage may be terminated by in rem jurisdiction, but
personal service is required for alimony. Ibid. Parker v. Parker, 335 Ill. App. 293, 81
N.E.2d 745 (1948); Beckmann v. Beckmann, 358 Mo. 1029, 218 SAV.2d 566 (1949);
Emmons v. Emmons, 124 Vt. 107, 197 A.2d 812 (1964).
,9 Liberalization of rules for annulment if desirable should come from the legisla-
ture, rather than by loose interpretations by the courts. See Woodworth v. Woodworth,
64 N.Y.S.2d 606, 611 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
,"See Vernon, Annulment of Marriage: A Proposed Model Act, 12 J. Pus. L. 143,
183 (1963).
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